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ABSTRACT The truel, or three way duel, has distinct properties from duels: the weakest contestant often has a very good chance
to win. This paper explores application of the logic of truels to election campaigns involving negative advertising. We show that
negative campaigning that pits the leading candidates against each other can create circumstances in which the third (or worse)
place candidate wins in one or more of the Nash equilibria of the game. We then study whether the simulated existence of an
opportunity for Nash equilibrium victory by third place candidates predicts such outcomes in U.S. state-wide elections.
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INTRODUCTION
Cree Deeds was trailing in the 2009 Virginia Democratic
gubernatorial primary. In third place in the polls. With a
smaller budget than his rivals. But then one of his rivals
initiated a negative advertising campaign targeting the
other. Deeds partly joined in the attack, while also making his positive case to the public. Ultimately, each rival
seemingly persuaded the public that the other should not
be chosen, and Deeds won. Like Deeds, sometimes candidates polling in third place (or even less than third place)
stage surprising election victories. This study explains
why, as a matter of logic, some of these victories should
be expected. We synthesize insights from the game theoretic study of truels and the political science study of negative campaigning to develop an original model which
explains why and when third place candidates sometimes
stage surprising come-from-behind victories.
This study applies to three-candidate elections with
negative and positive campaigning the logic of three-way
duels (called truels) which have principally been studied
in game theory and mathematics. Our key theoretical
results show that negative advertising campaigns with
more than two candidates share a key property with
other truels -- the potential for the weakest of the contestants to have a good chance of victory. Writing principally
in mathematics and game theory journals, Shubik (1954),
Kilgore (1971/72), and Kilgour and Brams (1997) developed analyses showing that the poorest shot sometimes

has the best chance to win a three-way gun fight. Bringing that insight into political science, this study shows
that electoral campaigns with negative advertising share
similar dynamics with gun fight truels even though the
campaign context is significantly distinct from the gun
battles analyzed in these earlier models – positive advertising for instance might undermine the chances of the
weakest to win. For a range of candidate capabilities, the
theoretical result of victory by the weakest from the truels
literature in game theory extends to the electoral campaign context in politics.
No previous model of negative advertising in multi-candidate electoral competition has developed the logic of
victory by the weakest from the truels literature to identify conditions for victory by the third place candidate.
In the only previous model of three-candidate negative
advertising contests, Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) concluded that in a 2 candidate race the frontrunner would
engage in more positive advertising than negative, whereas in a 3 candidate race the third place candidate will only
engage in positive advertising, and in a 3 candidate race
no candidate will engage in negative campaigning against
the weaker of his opponents. Our model upends all three
conclusions. Unlike the model of Gandhi et. al. (2016)
which focuses on the frequency of negative advertising
as a function of the number of candidates and the externalities generated by negative advertising, our analysis
focusses on the conditions in which various advertising
strategies are in equilibrium in three-candidate races, in-
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cluding equilibria where one or more candidates engage
in negative advertising.
For some political scientists and social choice theorists,
a model in which an initially weak candidate wins may
seem familiar to the point of unoriginality. Yet the synthesis offered here of the truels and negative campaigning literatures is unique. Obviously, the fundamental
instability results for models of n>2 candidate spatial
competition imply opportunities for weaker candidates
to win. And ours is not the first model in which such
victories are anticipated. Elections are well known to be
uncertain affairs, polling can be flawed, coordination or
band-wagoning can create a late surge, and multi-candidate multi-dimensional races are inherently unstable or
subject to cycling. Yet while useful, all of these answers
suggest that third (or worse) place is generally a disadvantageous place to be, but the weak candidate might
get lucky. Unlike previous explanations for the puzzle
of victory by third or worse place candidates, we do not
attribute their victory to accident, luck, not really being in
third place, or (directly at least) to the inherent instability
of multi-candidate choice.
We show that victory by the weakest in a negative campaign truel occurs in a Nash equilibrium -- in a context in
which in an honest and full-information retrospection,
the managers of the losing yet stronger campaigns would
have nothing specifically to regret. In the same circumstance and with full information, each losing candidate
could not have won through any unilateral alteration of
strategy. Indeed, they would have incentives to repeat
those strategies if the campaign was to develop in the
same way again, even though those strategies produced
victory by a third place or weaker candidate with weaker
initial public support and less money to spend on advertising.
Our analysis has implications for scholarship, showing
that despite the incentives (Gandhi et. al., 2016) that
discourage negative advertising in multi-candidate elections, negative advertising can play a prominent role in
the equilibria of these elections. It also has implications
for campaign strategists and practitioners, highlighting
the opportunities that negative advertising-focused contests among the leading candidates can create for victory
by a candidate with less initial support and resources.
We proceed as follows. Sections 1 and 2 develop our key
theoretical results, first illustrating victory by the weakest
in the gunfight n>2 duel from the game theory literature
in mathematics, and then extending that result to the
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more complex context of campaigns with positive and
negative advertising. Section 3 then applies those results
to illustrative cases and an analysis of state-wide U.S.
elections. Section 4 concludes.
1.1 A Gunfight Truel
Before proceeding into the analysis of campaigns, we begin by offering an example of a three way gun fight truel
to sharpen intuitions concerning the way the outcomes
of a three way duel studied in the mathematics literature
often involve victory by the weakest (Amengual and Toral
2006, Kilgour (1971/72; 1975, 1977), Kilgour and Brams
1997). A fundamental intuition behind the result is that
the two most accurate marksmen in a three-way gun fight
each pose a greater threat to each other than does the
weakest. Consequently, each has an incentive to initially
expend resources attacking the other, which increases
the odds that the weakest survives. Kilgour (1971/72)
summed up that “in many cases, the truel has a unique
equilibrium point at which the player who is the poorest
marksman has the greatest chance of survival.”
Imagine that three cowboy gunslingers have mutually
offended each other and are determined that the only
way to settle their disagreements is with a three-way
duel – a truel. This truel will have two rounds, and each
combatant has one bullet to use in each of the two
rounds. In each round each shooter decides whom to
target and all three shoot simultaneously. In the second
round, the combatants only know who is still alive. It is
common knowledge that the three gunslingers vary in the
probability with which they will hit a target they aim at, as
illustrated in Table 1. In light of the depth their grievances, each would rather be the only one alive at the end of
the truel of the law by citizens.
The solution to this game is by Subgame Perfect Nash
equilibrium (Osborne 1995). To solve by backward induction we begin with the last round. If all three players
survive, then any targeting strategy is an equilibrium. If
only two survive, then they target each other. Because
each would rather be targeted by a worse shot in round
two, each cowboy targets their opponent who is the best
shot in the first round. In equilibrium one targets two,
two targets one, and three targets one. As shown in the
final row of Table 1, the result of these targeting decisions
is that there is a very high probability that cowboy three
(the worst shot of the three) will be the only one to survive into the second round of the truel. And the cowboy
who is the best shot has the worst probability of surviving
to the second round. In this instance, as in many other
Richman
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n>2 duels, the outcome is often not victory by the strong
or the skilled, but victory by the weakest.
2.1 A Model of Election Advertising
This section proves that a third place candidate can win
in equilibrium as the result of a negative advertising truel,
and that the optimal strategy of the third place candidate
may involve either positive, or negative advertising depending upon the context and the relative effectiveness
of positive versus negative advertising. We then generalize this result to show that it persists even if candidates
can deviate to any mix of positive and negative advertising strategies.
We study a model of campaign competition which is deliberately simplified to include merely candidate support
levels (the candidate with the most support will win the
election) on the one hand, and candidate advertising
budgets (which candidates spend to influence support
through positive and negative ads) on the other hand.
The underlying psychological mechanisms driving candidate support might include voter perceptions of candidate ideological positions (Jessee 2012, Endersby and
Thomason 1994), it might be candidate valence or likes /
dislikes (Clarke, et al., 2011, Stokes 1963, 1992), it might
be party loyalty (Campbell et. al. 1960), retrospective
evaluations of party or presidential performance (Fiorina
1981), or something else.
The assumption that support (S) can be shifted through
advertising is a basic precondition for any model of
advertising strategy, and seems borne out by the enormous sums candidates often spend on advertising during
election campaigns. We assume that positive advertising
(P) boosts the support of the candidate using it by an
amount proportionate to the budget B allocated to it
such that the change in support equals BP or alternately
P(B). Conversely negative advertising (N) decreases the
support of the targeted candidate by -BN or alternately
N(B) (Geer, 2006). The specific mechanisms of advertising
influence might vary depending upon which mechanisms
(discussed above) shaping candidate support are targeted.
Candidates are indexed c = 1, … n, where 1 is the initially
strongest candidate in support and budget, and n is the
weakest candidate. The specific context in which the
campaign is fought is characterized by two parameters
that set the relative strength of each candidate. Each
candidate has a starting support and a starting budget.
B1, B2 and B3 indicate the starting budget for each candi32
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date with B1 > B2 > B3. S1, S2 and S3 indicate the starting
level of support for each candidate with S1> S2>S3. As a
result of each candidate’s strategy decisions, the budget and support levels change during the game, and the
player with the highest ending support wins the election.
Candidate payoffs are assumed to be based upon whether they win or not with U(win) > U(loss).
Each candidate has 4 options. The first option is positive advertising: P indicates that a candidate has chosen
a positive advertising campaign and B1P is the impact
on support for candidate 1 from spending budget B on
positive advertising. The next two options are negative
advertising against each one of the opponents: N2 indicates an attack on candidate 2 and N3 indicates an attack
on candidate 3. Thus, B1N2 is the change in candidate 2’s
support brought about by candidate 1 spending budget
B1 on negative advertising that attacks candidate 2. Finally, we allow candidates to decide not to spend (option
O for out): B1O indicates that candidate 1 has made the
choice to not spend which leaves all candidate support
levels unchanged. Since candidate support is always
higher under positive advertising, this option is weakly dominated by positive advertising (P) so it is of little
importance in most of our analyses. We also assume that
negative advertising potentially carries a cost “L” for the
support of the advertiser as studies have found evidence
that some types of negative advertising can reduce public
approval of the candidate doing the attack (Brooks &
Geer, 2007). We generalize the model below to allow for
mixing between options.
Our model does not assume a specific order of play and
the interaction modeled occurs within a single round
in which all candidates move simultaneously. It is thus
solved using Nash Equilibrium. Since each of the three
candidates has four available strategies, there are 64
possible strategy combinations, each associated with
a distinct set of final candidate support values. The
support levels resulting from a selection of the strategy
combinations are described in Table 2. Each cell contains
the support for candidate 1, candidate 2, and then candidate 3. For instance, in the top left cell of the table we see
the support of each candidate resulting from a choice by
candidate 1 to attack candidate 2, and choices by candidate 2 and candidate 3 to attack candidate 1. Here the
utility of candidate one reflects his or her starting support
(S1) combined with the reduced support imposed by
the attack of candidate 2 (-B2N1), the reduced support
imposed by the attack of candidate 3 (-B3N1) and the loss
to support resulting from running a negative campaign
against candidate 2 (-L).
Virginia Social Science Journal
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To find equilibria, we identify best responses by each
candidate to actions by the other candidates, based on
the assumption that each candidate cares only about
victory – about having a higher support than any other
candidate. On the basis of these best responses, Nash
equilibria in pure strategies can be identified in which
no campaign had an incentive to change strategy. There
are several pure strategy combinations that can produce
victory for the weakest candidate in equilibrium including (N2, N1, N1), (N2, N1, P), and (P, N1, P). Each strategy
profile can be a Nash equilibria of the game for some
parameter values.
Claim 1. If all six inequalities (1 through 6) listed below
are satisfied there a Nash equilibrium (N2, N1, P) in which
the third place candidate wins the election by adopting a
positive advertising strategy.

Conditions for Victory by Third Place Candidate Running Positive Campaign While
Opponents Attack Each Other:
S3 +
S1 – B2N1 – L
B3P >
S3 +
S2 – B1N2 – L
B3P >
S3 +
S1 – B2N1 + B1P
B3P >
S3 +
S2 – B1N2 + B2P
B3P >
S2
S1 – B2N1
>
S1
S2 – B1N2
>

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Proof: if first two inequalities (equations 1 and 2) are satisfied, then C3 will win the election if no player deviates
from the strategy profile. If the second two inequalities
are satisfied (equations 3 and 4), then neither of the other
players can benefit from deviating from this strategy
profile by running a positive campaign because each will
still suffer a loss. If the last two inequalities are satisfied
(equations 5 and 6) then neither of the other candidates
(1 and 2) can benefit from deviating from this strategy
profile by attacking candidate 3 instead because this will
lead to the other of these two candidates winning. For
instance, if candidate 1 attacks C3 instead of C2, then C2
wins. Equations 5 and 6 constitute a closeness condition: the first and second place candidates must be close
enough to each other than each cannot win if the other is
Vol. 54
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permitted to run unanswered negative attacks.
Since inequalities 1, 2 and 4 will be satisfied if 3 is satisfied (following from the relatively weaker support and
budget of the second place candidate), we solve for the
critical starting support and budget levels of the third
place candidate using inequality 3. The critical support
level for the third place candidate to be able to win in
equilibrium with a positive campaign if the closeness
condition is satisfied is:
S3 > S1 – B2N1 + B1P - B3P
And the critical budget level for victory by the third place
candidate is:
B3 > (S1 – B2N1 + B1P - S3)/P
Claim 2. An alternate set of closeness conditions obtain
when the first place candidate adopts a positive advertising strategy in the Nash equilibrium (P, N1, P) with candidates 1 and 3 running positive campaigns, and candidate
2 running a negative campaign. Equations 1 through 4
must still be satisfied. The alternative conditions to Equations 5 and 6 are 8 and 9 below:

Conditions for Victory by Third Place Candidate Running Positive Campaign While
Opponents Attack Each Other:
S3 +
S1 – B2N1 – L
B3P >
S3 +
S2 – B1N2 – L
B3P >
S3 +
S1 – B2N1 + B1P
B3P >
S3 +
S2 – B1N2 + B2P
B3P >
S2
S1 – B2N1
>
S1
S2 – B1N2
>

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

If the conditions in equations 3 and 7 are satisfied, then
candidate 3 will win. If the condition in equation 8 is
satisfied, then player 1 cannot win by shifting to an attack
on player 3 (and obviously shifting to an attack on player
2 will not lead to victory if equation 3 holds). If the condition in equation 9 is satisfied, then player 2 cannot win by
shifting to a positive campaign (and obviously shifting to
an attack on player 3 will not lead to victory if equation 9
is true).
Claim 3. For the third place candidate to win in equilibrium through a negative advertising strategy of attacking
Richman
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the first place candidate (N2, N1, N1), the following conditions must hold:

Conditions for Victory by Third
Place Candidate Running Negative Campaign:
S3
S1 – B2N1 – B3N1
>
S3
S2 – B1N2
>
S3
S1 – B2N1 – B3N1 + B1P + L
>
S3
S2 – B1N2 + B2P + L
>
S2
S1 – B2N1 – B3N1
>
S1
>

S2 – B1N2 + B3N1

(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)

2.2 Extension to Mixed Advertising Campaigns

Proof: if the conditions outlined in equations 10 and
11 prevail, then candidate 3 will win because the third
candidate will have the highest level of support. If the
conditions outlined in equations 12 and 13 prevail then
neither of the other candidates can win by deviating from
the posited equilibrium strategy individually to run a positive campaign, and if the closeness conditions in 14 and
15 obtain, then neither candidate can deviate to an attack
on candidate 3 without losing to the other candidate: if
candidate 1 attacks 3, then candidate 2 wins. Condition
15 always obtains by assumption because S1>S2 and
B1N2 > B3N1.
Note that a critical condition for this equilibrium is that
attack by the first-place candidate on the second place
candidate must be sufficiently powerful that the second
place candidate has a lower support than the third place
candidate (equation 11). Thus, the second-place candidate must be weaker than was required in claim 1, so
there are conditions in which a positive campaign by the
third-place candidate would bring victory but a negative
campaign would not. On the other hand, when B3P <
B3N1 – L, the condition in equation 12 will be met more
readily than the condition in equation 3, indicating the
existence of circumstances in which the unique winning
strategy in equilibrium is for the third place candidate
to attack if negative advertising has a sufficiently larger
impact than positive advertising.

34
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Figure 1 illustrates that when positive and negative campaigning have equal effectiveness, the weakest candidate
is generally best off running a positive campaign. For the
selected parameter values, a positive campaign by the
weakest candidate can result in victory in every circumstance in which a negative campaign would also lead to
victory, but there are also a range of initial budget and
support levels for the weakest candidate for which only
a positive campaign can generate a Nash equilibrium
in which the weakest wins. The area within the triangle
bounded by dotted lines indicates the range of parameter
values for which the third-place candidate is weakest yet
can win in equilibrium by running a positive campaign.
The quadrilateral bounded by dashed lines indicates the
range of parameter values for which the third-place candidate is weakest in respect to both support and budget,
yet can win in equilibrium by running a negative campaign against the first place candidate.

Richman

So far, we have maintained the simplifying assumption
that candidates must devote the entirety of their resources to a single advertising strategy. The purpose of this
section is to show that equilibria involving victory by the
third-place candidate (3) still occur when candidates can
devote their budget to a mix of advertising strategies.
We now allow candidates to select any combination of
strategies. Let b1P + b1N2 + b1N3+ b1O=B1 represent
the portions of candidate 1’s budget being devoted to
each of the available strategies. Thus, if b1P = b1N2 =
B1/2, candidate 1 is devoting half of his or her budget to
positive campaigning, and half to negative attacks on
candidate two. For simplicity we drop the assumption (L)
that negative campaigning hurts the candidate engaging
in it below.
Claim 4. For candidate three to win in equilibrium under
mixed advertising strategies the following conditions
must hold:
Proof: If equation 16 is true, then the support of candidate 3 exceeds that of candidate 1, and if equation 17
is true, then the support of candidate 3 exceeds that of
candidate 2. Hence, candidate 3 will have the highest
support, and will win.
For this to be an equilibrium, all candidates must be
choosing budget shares that best respond to all other
candidates with the above inequalities satisfied. Therefore, it must be the case that neither candidate 1 nor
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Table 1. A Gun-Fight Truel
Probability (hits Equilibrium probability of
target)
0.9
0.8
0.7

Cowboy 1
Cowboy 2
Cowboy 3

survival into second round
6 percent
10 percent
100 percent

Table 2. Candidate Support as a Result of Strategic Choices
C3=N1
C2 = N1

C2 = N3

C2 = P

C2 = O

C1 = N2

S1- B2N1- B3N1-L, S2- B1N2-L, S3-L

S1 - B3N1-L, S2- B1N2-L, S3- B2N3-L

S1 - B3N1-L, S2+ B2P- B1N2, S3-L

S1 - B3N1-L, S2 - B1N2, S3-L

C1 = N3

S1 - B2N1- B3N1-L,S2 -L, S3- B1N3-L

S1 - B3N1-L, S2 -L, S3- B1N3- B2N3-L

S1 - B3N1-L, S2+ B2P, S3- B1N3-L

S1 - B3N1-L, S2, S3- B1N3-L

C1 = P

S1+ B1P - B2N1- B3N1, S2- L, S3-L

S1+ B1P - B3N1, S2- L, S3- B2N3-L

S1+ B1P - B3N1, S2+ B2P, S3-L

S1+ B1P - B3N1, S2, S3-L

C1 = O

S1 - B2N1- B3N1,S2- L, S3-L

S1 - B3N1, S2- L, S3- B2N3-L

S1 - B3N1, S2+ B2P, S3-L

S1 - B3N1, S2, S3-L

C3=N2
C1 = N2

S1- B2N1 -L, S2-B1N2-B3N2-L, S3-L

S1 -L, S2- B1N2-B3N2-L, S3- B2N3-L

S1 -L, S2+ B2P- B1N2-B3N2, S3-L

S1 -L, S2- B1N2-B3N2, S3-L

C1 = N3

S1 - B2N1-L, S2-B3N2 -L, S3- B1N3-L

S1 -L, S2-B3N2 -L, S3- B1N3- B2N3-L

S1 -L, S2+ B2P-B3N2, S3- B1N3-L

S1 -L, S2-B3N2, S3- B1N3-L

C1 = P

S1+ B1P - B2N1, S2-B3N2- L, S3-L

S1+ B1P , S2-B3N2- L, S3- B2N3-L

S1+ B1P , S2+ B2P-B3N2, S3-L

S1+ B1P , S2-B3N2, S3-L

C1 = O

S1 - B2N1, S2-B3N2- L, S3-L

S1, S2-B3N2- L, S3- B2N3-L

S1, S2+ B2P-B3N2, S3-L

S1, S2-B3N2, S3-L

C1 = N2

S1- B2N1 -L, S2-B1N2 -L, S3+B3P

S1 -L, S2- B1N2-L, S3- B2N3+B3P

S1 -L, S2+ B2P- B1N2, S3+B3P

S1 -L, S2- B1N2, S3+B3P

C1 = N3

S1 - B2N1-L, S2 -L, S3- B1N3 +B3P

S1 -L, S2 -L, S3- B1N3- B2N3+B3P

S1 -L, S2+ B2P, S3- B1N3+B3P

S1 -L, S2, S3- B1N3+B3P

C1 = P

S1+B1P - B2N1, S2- L, S3+B3P

S1+ B1P , S2- L, S3- B2N3+B3P

S1+ B1P , S2+ B2P, S3+B3P

S1+ B1P , S2, S3+B3P

C1 = O

S1- B2N1, S2- L, S3+B3P

S1, S2- L, S3- B2N3+B3P

S1, S2+ B2P, S3+B3P

S1, S2, S3+B3P

C3 = P

C3 = O
C1 = N2

S1- B2N1 -L, S2-B1N2 -L, S3

S1 -L, S2- B1N2-L, S3- B2N3

S1 -L, S2+ B2P- B1N2, S3

S1 -L, S2- B1N2, S3

C1 = N3

S1 - B2N1-L, S2 -L, S3- B1N3

S1 -L, S2 -L, S3- B1N3- B2N3

S1 -L, S2+ B2P, S3- B1N3

S1 -L, S2, S3- B1N3

C1 = P

S1+B1P - B2N1, S2- L, S3

S1+ B1P , S2- L, S3- B2N3

S1+ B1P , S2+ B2P, S3

S1+ B1P , S2, S3

C1 = O

S1- B2N1, S2- L, S3

S1, S2- L, S3- B2N3

S1, S2+ B2P, S3

S1, S2, S3
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Figure 1: 111ustrative Condit ions for Victory by 'Weakest:
Eq ua I Effectiveness of Positive and Negative Cam pa igns
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candidate 2 has an individual incentive to deviate from
their strategy. In other words, holding the other candidate’s strategies constant, there must be no deviation
that allows a losing candidate to gain a larger level of
support than the strongest of the other candidates. In the
absence of such a strategy, each candidate will be indifferent between their alternatives, which is the necessary
condition for maintaining the mixed strategy. If equation
18 holds, then candidate 1 has no feasible combination
of positive and negative advertising that allows the
candidate to win (though as above in pure strategies, the
candidate might be able to choose which of his or her
opponents will win). Similarly, if equation 19 holds, then
candidate 2 has no feasible combination of positive and
negative advertising strategies that allows the candidate
to win.
This analysis shows that there continue to be conditions
in which a negative advertising truel produces victory for
the weakest candidate, even if the other candidates can
play a mix of strategies. Figure 3 illustrates the range of
budget and support values under which a Nash equilibrium exists that leads to victory by the weakest candidate by adding lines delineating the boundaries of the
area in which an equilibrium exists in which the winning
candidate is initially the weakest as a function of the
initial budget and support of the candidates. To facilitate comparison, the parameters for the effectiveness of
positive versus negative campaigning, and the support
and budget values of the leading candidates are kept the
same as in Figure 2. In addition, we assume that the third
place candidate only plays one strategy – either b3P =
B3 or b3N1 = B3. For this set of parameters, the region in
which positive campaigning by the weakest candidate
can produce victory shrinks, but the area in which negative campaigning by the weakest candidate can produce
victory increases once all candidates are permitted to select mixed strategies that potentially involve both positive
advertising and attacks one or both opponents.
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